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Rules restricting resource use are ubiquitous to conservation. Recent increases in poaching of 22 
iconic species such as African elephant and rhino have triggered high-profile interest in 23 
enforcement. Previous studies have used economic models to explore how the probability and 24 
severity of sanctions influence poacher-behaviour. Yet despite evidence that compliance can 25 
be substantial when the threat of state-imposed sanctions is low and profits high, few have 26 
explored other factors deterring rule-breaking. We use the randomised response technique 27 
(RRT) and direct questions to estimate the proportion of rural residents in north-western 28 
Taiwan illegally killing wildlife. We then model how potential sources of deterrence: 29 
perceived probabilities of detection and punishment, social norms and self-imposed guilt, 30 
relate to non-compliant behaviour (reported via RRT). The perceived likelihood of being 31 
punished and two types of social norms (injunctive and descriptive) predict behaviour and 32 
deter rule-breaking. Harnessing social norms that encourage compliance offers potential for 33 
reducing the persecution of threatened species.  34 
 35 
Keywords: compliance; enforcement; guilt; randomized response technique; social norms 36 
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1. Introduction 38 
Effective conservation depends on understanding human behaviours, particularly those that 39 
threaten biodiversity such as illegal logging (Laurance 2008), fishing (Hilborn 2007) and 40 
hunting (Milner-Gulland and Bennett 2003). Positive incentives, such as the provision of 41 
resources to those behaving in a pro-conservation manner, is one way of encouraging 42 
behaviour change (Milner-Gulland and Rowcliffe 2007). However, conservation and natural 43 
resource management are widely dependent upon negative incentives, principally the making 44 
and enforcing of rules that restrict access and use of resources (St. John et al. 2013).As a 45 
result, successful management demands an understanding of factors deterring rule-breaking 46 
so that compliance can be encouraged.  47 
 48 
Recent increases in wildlife crime including the poaching of iconic, commercially valuable 49 
species such as African elephant (Burn et al. 2011) and white rhino (Biggs et al. 2013; Smith 50 
et al. 2013) have triggered increased interest in enforcement (Goldenberg 2013; The White 51 
House 2013)which typically involves the use of patrols to detect infractions (Keane et al. 52 
2008) and the application of state-imposed legal sanctions to punish violators. By increasing 53 
the severity of sanctions, criminal justice policies aim to increase deterrence (Kennedy 1997). 54 
Rational choice theories of crime assume that individuals weigh up potential costs 55 
(probability of being detected and likelihood and severity of penalties), rewards and 56 
preferences when deciding how to act (Becker 1968; Garoupa 1997). The rational actor 57 
therefore should comply when fairly certain of capture and punishment. The physical 58 
distribution or ‘ecology’ of crimes suggests that offenders do make rational choices: by 59 
committing crimes against poorly protected targets (e.g. houses, public property or people) in 60 
familiar locations, offenders reduce risk, effort, and inconvenience (Clarke and Cornish 61 
1985).  However, the assumption that offenders act as rational utility maximizers who 62 
respond to the threat of sanctions in a predictable fashion has been challenged (Akers and 63 
Sellers 2009; Paternoster 1987). Evidence suggests that, constrained by availability of time, 64 
ability and information, human behaviour is only boundedly rational (Simon 1955): rather 65 
than assessing the pros and cons of alternative courses of action, people employ ‘shortcuts’ or 66 
rules-of-thumb (also referred to as heuristics) when processing information and opt for 67 
satisfactory rather than optimal solutions (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke 68 
1986; Milner-Gulland 2012). Further, social-psychological factors also influence people’s 69 
behaviour. With respect to pro-environmental behaviours, attitude, social norms, behavioural 70 
control and moral norms influence the decisions that people make (Bamberg and Möser 71 
2007; Mastrangelo et al. 2013; Williams et al. 2012), whilst people’s feelings (Van Gelder 72 
2012), perceptions of informal social control (Felson 1986), self-control (Pratt and Cullen 73 
2000) and an ability to manage fears, moral scruples and guilt influence criminal decision 74 
making (Cornish and Clarke 1986).  75 
 76 
There is evidence that investment in conservation law enforcement is effective. For example, 77 
anti-poaching patrols were a determining factor in the recovery of African buffalo and 78 
elephant in Serengeti National Park, Tanzania (Hilborn et al. 2006) and increased 79 
effectiveness of anti-poaching patrols reduced poaching of wildlife in Ghana’s protected 80 
areas (Jachmann 2008). Enforcement however is costly and studies investigating illegal 81 
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behaviour have reported mixed results concerning the influence that probabilities of capture 82 
and punishment have on actors (Kroneberg et al. 2010). For example, compliance in some 83 
fisheries was found to be high despite low probabilities of detection and illegal profits in 84 
excess of fines (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999), the threat of detection failed to deter drink-85 
driving (Berger and Snortum 1986) and the expectations of capture and punishment were 86 
unrelated to people’s intention to commit tax fraud or shop-lift (Kroneberg et al. 2010). In 87 
addition, industry characteristics more strongly deterred corporate crime compared to formal 88 
sanction risk (Simpson and Koper 1992). This raises questions about what other factors 89 
encourage compliance and whether they can be harnessed to supplement or even reduce 90 
reliance on conventional and costly enforcement.  91 
 92 
Economic models of law enforcement in conservation and natural resource management have 93 
incorporated probabilities of detection and punishment based upon information including 94 
enforcement data and legal proceedings (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992; Sumaila 95 
et al. 2006). However, would-be-violators do not know the actual probability of being caught 96 
or punished, rather their behaviour is influenced by their perceived threat of enforcement 97 
action (Grasmick and Bryjak 1980; Grasmick and Green 1980). Studies investigating the 98 
links between perceived sanction risk and severity generally find that criminality is lower 99 
amongst those perceiving higher risks of detection and severity of punishment (Nagin 1998). 100 
There is evidence in conservation that rule-breakers adjust their perceptions of the risks of 101 
sanctions. For example, following an initial market inspection, trade in the North Sulewesi 102 
endemic babirusa (babyrousa celebensis) halted for one year. However, by the third 103 
inspection trade only stopped for one month as traders refined their perceptions of the threat 104 
of capture from high to the true level of virtually zero (Milner-Gulland and Clayton 2002). 105 
However, none have investigated how an individual’s compliance behaviour relates to their 106 
reports of the perceived probabilities of detection and punishment.  107 
 108 
Any factor that reduces the expected utility of a crime may encourage compliance and 109 
empirical evidence suggests that sources of social control may play a greater role in shaping 110 
compliance compared to the certainty and severity of punishment (Paternoster 1987). In 111 
addition to regulations enforced by formal institutions, social norms (obligatory, shared or 112 
forbidden behaviours) mediate the way in which people in societies behave (Ostrom 2000). 113 
Peers may reward individuals for following social norms by conferring status or material 114 
resources towards them, or punish transgressions through ostracism or the withholding of 115 
favours or goods (Posner 1997). Social norms have been found to deter a range of antisocial 116 
behaviours including drink-driving (Berger and Snortum 1986), illegal gambling (Grasmick 117 
and Green 1980) and environmental theft (Cialdini 2003). Further, enforcement within some 118 
fisheries appears to stem largely from social influences (Gezelius 2002; Sutinen and Gauvin 119 
1989). For example, Norwegian fishers comply for fear of being labelled dishonourable by 120 
gossiping peers (Gezelius 2002). Evidence from social psychology suggests that two types of 121 
social norm influence behaviour: injunctive norms (what people typically approve of) and 122 
descriptive norms (what people typically do) (Cialdini et al. 1991). To date, the role of these 123 
two types of social norm in encouraging compliance with conservation rules has not been 124 




The behaviour of individuals is also regulated by internal feelings such as guilt, shame and 127 
self-esteem. Anticipated or actual guilt may be felt by an individual when they consider 128 
performing, or actually execute a behaviour that defies their morals, values or social norms 129 
(Vining and Ebreo 2002). The immediate response may be felt in the form or physiological 130 
discomfort, however, long-term impacts may include anxiety or depression impeding 131 
personal performance (Grasmick and Bursik 1990). Whilst acts that trigger guilt may differ 132 
between cultures (Scollon et al. 2004), feelings of guilt have been shown to influence a range 133 
of behaviours including willingness to help others (Freedman et al. 1967), participate in 134 
extra-curricular activities (Boster et al. 1999) and engage in pro-environmental behaviours 135 
(Ahn et al. 2013). With respect to compliance, guilt has been found to have a stronger 136 
influence on behaviour compared to the threat of capture in the case of tax fraud and drunk-137 
driving (Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Wenzel 2004). Whilst fishers have reported feeling 138 
‘morally uncomfortable’ when breaking the law (Gezelius 2002; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999), 139 
the utility of self-imposed guilt as a deterrent has not been investigated within a conservation 140 
and natural resource management context.  141 
 142 
Understanding the potential value of such factors as deterrents requires that they be linked to 143 
reports of people’s compliance behaviour. Innovative developments in the analysis of 144 
randomised response data (van den Hout et al. 2007) recently applied in conservation (St. 145 
John et al. 2012) support such an approach. The randomised response technique (RRT) 146 
(Warner 1965) has improved estimates of rule-breaking in conservation producing higher 147 
estimates of non-compliance compared to direct questions (Razafimanahaka et al. 2012; 148 
Solomon et al. 2007; St. John et al. 2010a). By using a randomising device such as dice, RRT 149 
provides respondents with levels of protection greater than a simple guarantee of anonymity. 150 
For example, provided with a beaker and a die, respondents may be instructed to: answer a 151 
sensitive question truthfully choosing ‘yes’ or ‘no’ if the die lands on one through to four 152 
(probability = 0.66); select ‘yes’ if the die lands on five (probability = 0.167); or select ‘no’ if 153 
the die lands on six (probability = 0.167) (St. John et al. 2010a).  The result of the die is never 154 
revealed to the interviewer so a truthful response can never be distinguished from a 155 
prescribed one. By adapting the logistic regression model to account for answers forced by 156 
the randomising device (van den Hout et al. 2007), characteristics of respondents (e.g. 157 
attitudes) can be linked to behaviours of interest such as killing of protected carnivores (St. 158 
John et al. 2012).  159 
 160 
In this study we use both RRT and direct questions (DQ) to estimate the proportion of rural 161 
residents in north-western Taiwan killing four species as well as asking someone else to hunt 162 
a legally protected endangered species on their behalf. We then use an adapted form of 163 
logistic regression (St. John et al. 2012; van den Hout et al. 2007) to investigate the potential 164 
deterrent effects of the perceived probabilities of detection and punishment, injunctive and 165 
descriptive norms, and self-imposed guilt on wildlife persecution reported via RRT (Figure 166 
1). By linking reports of rule-breaking behaviour to potential sources of deterrence, this study 167 
makes a novel contribution to the study of conservation enforcement, a neglected area of 168 





Figure 1 Conceptual framework of factors influencing an individual’s decision to hunt a 172 
legally protected species. All things held equal, the more strongly a person believes killing a 173 
protected species is disapproved of, that others do not kill protected species, that the 174 
probability of being caught and punished is high, and that they would feel guilty for engaging 175 
in such a behaviour, the more deterred they are from hunting illegally. 176 
 177 
2. Methods 178 
2.1 Case study: wildlife persecution in rural north western Taiwan 179 
Data from ecological surveys confirm the existence of leopard cat (Prionailurus bengalensis 180 
chinensis) and masked palm civet (Paguma larvata taivana) within Miaoli County, Taiwan 181 
(Pei 2008). Before 1970 the leopard cat population was greatly reduced through habitat loss 182 
and commercial harvesting for their skin, resulting in a call for their legal protection (Ian 183 
1979; McCullough 1974). Now listed as endangered under Taiwan’s Wildlife Conservation 184 
Act (WCA) (Council of Agriculture 1989), Miaoli County is probably the only area where a 185 
viable population of this species is still found (Pei 2008). Whilst more common, the masked 186 
palm civet, long popular in game meat markets (Wang 1986) is also protected under the 187 
WCA due to intensive trapping pressure in rural areas. Article 21 of the WCA only permits 188 
the authorised killing of protected species under limited circumstances including risk to 189 
human life, damage to crops or stock and for indigenous people’s traditional ceremonies or 190 
rituals. Any unauthorised person caught killing protected wildlife may be fined between 191 
NT$200 000 and NT$1 000 000 (between approx. US$6 600 and US$33 000) and face up to 192 
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five years in prison. Despite these considerable sanctions, anecdotes from Miaoli County 193 
suggest that leopard cat and masked palm civet are still trapped for the commercial gain of 194 
professional hunters, and, with respect to leopard cat, because they are perceived by poultry 195 
farmers as pest. Other species including rodents and ferret badger (Melogale moschata) are 196 
not protected under the WCA but are included in this study so that both illegal and legal 197 
behaviours could be investigated. All species are found across the study site (Pei 2008). 198 
 199 
2.2 Data collection 200 
We drafted the questionnaire (available from F.A.V.St.John) in English, it was then translated 201 
to Chinese and back-translated to English to verify the translation. We then piloted it on 202 
colleagues, clarifying wording where required, before a formal pilot with residents within the 203 
study site. The questionnaire were administered through face-to-face interviews at the homes 204 
of residents between August and October 2012 by CHM. Hakka, Taiwanese or Mandarin (all 205 
dialects spoken by CHM) were used to deliver the questions; as there are no written 206 
characters for Hakka and Taiwanese, Chinese characters were used throughout.  The 207 
sampling strategy used to identify respondents involved multiple steps. First, we identified 208 
three townships in Miaoli County with the highest leopard cat densities using data from 209 
camera trap surveys (Pei 2008). Second, after excluding urban areas we listed all rural 210 
villages per township; the RAND function in Microsoft Excel was then used to select a 211 
simple random sample (Newing 2011) of four villages per township. Lastly, using either the 212 
phone book (two townships) or electoral role (one township) as a sampling frame, we 213 
systematically sampled (Newing 2011) 20 households per village by selecting every nth 214 
household on the list (the first house to be surveyed was selected using the 215 
RANDBETWEEN function in Microsoft Excel) i.e. we sampled 242 households across the 216 
12 villages; approximately 4% of the total households. Within households, elder members 217 
were recruited as respondents as locally they were believed to have more experiences with 218 
the study species. Names of villages are not revealed to protect respondents.  219 
 220 
To verify respondents’ familiarity with species included in the questionnaire we showed 221 
respondents photos of study species (rodents, ferret badger, masked palm civet and leopard 222 
cat) and non-study species (domestic cat and pangolin). Those familiar with each of the study 223 
species completed the questionnaire which included sections on rule-breaking (RRT and 224 
DQ), demographics and three potential sources of deterrence. Using the Morakot ‘88’ flood 225 
of 2009 as a historic reference, RRT and DQ questions referred to the last three years (e.g. for 226 
DQ: ‘Since the 88 Flood which was 3 years ago, did you kill any leopard cats?’). This time 227 
period was chosen as it was considered long enough to have allowed the behaviours under 228 
investigation to have occurred whilst not being too long ago for people to remember.  229 
 230 
2.3 Estimating the proportion of people killing wildlife 231 
We used the ‘forced response’ randomised response technique (Warner 1965) to question 232 
respondents about their involvement in the killing of wildlife and whether they had requested 233 
another to hunt a leopard cat on their behalf. Respondents were given a set of instruction and 234 
question cards, including one example question, a pair of dice and a non-transparent beaker. 235 
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RRT was first explained to respondents using the example question: ‘Since 88 Flood” which 236 
was three years ago, did you ever ride a motorbike without a helmet?’ Roles of interviewer 237 
and respondent were reversed when required and the interviewer did not proceed with RRT 238 
questions until it was clear that the respondent understood the method. Before each RRT 239 
question, respondents shook the dice in the beaker and added the value of the dice together. If 240 
the sum of the two dice came to five through to ten (probability = 3/4), respondents were 241 
asked to answer the sensitive question honestly by saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ out load to the 242 
interviewer. If the dice summed two, three or four (probability 1/6) respondents were 243 
instructed to give a fixed answer ‘yes’. Finally, if the dice summed 11 or 12 (probability 244 
1/12), respondents were instructed to give the fixed answer ‘no’. Respondents never revealed 245 
their dice roll to the interviewer therefore the interviewer could not tell if a respondent was 246 
saying ‘yes’ because they have performed the sensitive behaviour, or because they were 247 
providing a prescribed response. However, by knowing the probability of respondents 248 
instructed to answer honestly, and the probability of respondents instructed to provide the 249 
prescribed response of ‘yes’, the prevalence of the sensitive characteristic could be estimated. 250 
To maximise respondents’ compliance with RRT instructions we used the analogy of playing 251 
a game encouraging respondents to follow RRT instructions just as they would follow the 252 
rules of a game. Literacy and numeracy are high in Taiwan so are not believed to limit 253 
respondents’ understanding or use of RRT. 254 
 255 
In order to test the utility of RRT, we asked respondents the same wildlife killing questions 256 
directly at the end of the questionnaire. The wording of DQ and RRT questions was identical. 257 
Respondents answered DQs by placing a tick in either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ box.  258 
 259 
2.4 Perceived probabilities of detection and punishment as deterrents 260 
Economic models of enforcement focus on the probabilities of rule-breaking being detected 261 
and punished, with non-compliance occurring when the benefits outweigh the costs (Becker 262 
1968). To investigate how the perceived probability of being caught relates to behaviour 263 
(measured via RRT) we asked respondents to indicate how frequently they believed the 264 
authorities would catch them if they killed each of the four species. Respondents also 265 
reported their perceived likelihood of receiving a penalty for killing each animal if they were 266 
caught (eight statements in total). Answers were given using a five-point Likert scale (from 267 
‘never’ through to ‘always’) coded so that lower scores corresponded to lower deterrence.    268 
 269 
2.5 Social norms as deterrents  270 
To understand the relationship between social pressures and behaviour reported via RRT we 271 
investigated two different types of social norms: injunctive norms, which measure what 272 
friends, family or peers typically approve or disapprove of; and descriptive norms which 273 
capture respondents’ perceptions of how other people typically behave (Cialdini 2003). To 274 
measure injunctive norms we asked respondents to indicate on a five point Likert scale (from 275 
‘highly disapprove’ through to ‘highly approve’) the degree to which they thought their 276 
family and friends would approve or disapprove of them for killing each of the four species 277 
(four statements in total). We measured descriptive norms by asking respondents to state 278 
whether or not they thought people that they know, had killed each of the species in the last 279 
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three years. Response options were ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The coding of answers for injunctive and 280 
descriptive norms means that lower scores suggest weaker social deterrence for wildlife 281 
persecution. 282 
 283 
2.6 Self-imposed guilt as a deterrent 284 
To investigate the relationship between anticipated guilt and behaviour reported via RRT, we 285 
asked respondents to indicate, using a five point Likert scale (from ‘strongly agree’ through 286 
to ‘strongly disagree’) how much they agreed or disagree with the statement ‘I would feel 287 
guilty if I killed x’. This statement was repeated for each of the four species. Higher scores 288 
were indicative of stronger feelings of guilt, which is suggestive of stronger self-imposed 289 
deterrence for killing wildlife.  290 
 291 
2.8 Data analysis 292 
We analysed data using R version 2.15.0 (R Development Core Team 2012). The proportion 293 
of respondents admitting via RRT to killing each species was estimated using the following 294 
equation (Hox and Lensvelt-Mulders 2004): 295 
 296 





where π is the estimated proportion of the sample admitting to the behaviour, λ is the 298 
proportion of all answers that are ‘yes’,   is the probability of the answer being a prescribed 299 
‘yes’, and s is the probability of being asked to answer the question truthfully. Ninety-five per 300 
cent confidence intervals for RRT and DQ data were estimated from 10,000 bootstrap 301 
samples (St. John et al. 2012). A significant difference between RRT and DQ estimates was 302 
concluded when the 95% confidence intervals for the mean difference did not include zero 303 
(St. John et al. 2010a).  304 
 305 
Before modelling, we used Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Cortina 1993) to check each set of 306 
four species-specific statements measuring the probability of being caught, probability of 307 
receiving a penalty, injunctive norm and self-imposed guilt for internal consistency. 308 
Categories within predictor variables measuring probabilities of detection and punishment 309 
were collapsed from five to two representing ‘never caught’ and ‘sometimes caught’. 310 
Categories measuring injunctive norms and anticipated guilt were collapsed from five to three 311 
corresponding to low, neutral and high levels of social approval and guilt.  312 
 313 
Following St. John et al. (2012), we used generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) with a 314 
binary response and binomial error to investigate relationships between behaviour reported 315 
via RRT and each predictor variable. GLMMs were fitted by penalised-quasi-likelihood using 316 
the glmmPQL function from the MASS package. Because of the forced ‘yes’ responses 317 
contained within randomised response data, simple logistic regression is not appropriate 318 
therefore models were fitted using a customised link function able to incorporate the known 319 
probabilities of the prescribed RRT responses (St. John et al. 2012; van den Hout et al. 2007) 320 
(supplementary material). To account for the grouping structure of the data whereby each 321 
10 
 
respondent answered multiple questions on each species, we included respondent ID as a 322 
random effect. Species, probability of detection, likelihood of punishment, injunctive and 323 
descriptive norms and anticipated guilt were all independently considered as potential fixed 324 
effects in GLMMs. We generated predictive scenarios illustrative of respondents reporting 325 
polar opposites of opinions from fitted GLMMs.  326 
 327 
3. Results 328 
Two hundred and forty two residents completed the questionnaire. Most respondents were 329 
male (64.5%, n = 242) which reflects the underlying population (Miaoli County Government 330 
Household Registration Service 2014) and the mean age was 62 years (s.e. = 0.84, n = 242). 331 
Because our sampling strategy targeted elder members of households, the sample does not 332 
perfectly represent the underlying population in terms of age (people above and below 55 333 
years of age were over and under sampled respectively) (Miaoli County Government 334 
Household Registration Service 2014). The primary occupation of most interviewees was 335 
agriculture, forestry or fish-farming (60.7%, n = 147), whilst some worked in industry, 336 
commerce, or the service sector (19.8%, n = 48), were unemployed (16.9% n = 41), or 337 
engaged in other occupations (2.5%, n = 6). Nearly all respondents were farming some type 338 
of crop (91.3%, n = 221), and 47.9% (n = 116) were keeping poultry. Over eighty percent of 339 
respondents (80.2%, n = 194) were aware that there was no penalty for killing rodents whilst 340 
43% (n = 104) knew there was no penalty for killing ferret badgers. Less than one-quarter 341 
(24.0%, n = 58) of the sample reported being aware that there is a penalty for killing leopard 342 
cats; fewer (13.6%, n = 33) reported being aware that penalties exist for killing masked palm 343 
civet. Few respondents (4%, n = 10) reported thinking that leopard cats were a pest; these ten 344 
respondents stocked fewer head of poultry (43.2, s.e. = 17.5) compared to the sample mean 345 
(274.9, s.e. = 180.9, n = 116).  346 
 347 
Cronbach’s alpha was high for each set of four species-specific statements measuring the 348 
probability of detection (0.75, n = 242), receiving a punishment (0.74, n = 242), injunctive 349 
norms (0.77, n = 242), and anticipated guilt (0.79, n = 242) indicating high interval 350 
consistency.  351 
 352 
3.1 estimating the proportion of people killing wildlife 353 
The proportion of respondents estimated by RRT and DQ to have killed each of the four 354 
species, or asked a hunter to kill a leopard cat in the last three years is shown in Figure 2. 355 
RRT produced higher estimates than DQ for each of the five behaviours (significantly higher 356 
for masked palm civet and asking a hunter to kill a leopard cat). Over 40% (42.7%) (mean 357 
difference between RRT and DQ estimates 3.05%) and 12.4% (mean difference between 358 
RRT and DQ 4.63%) of respondents admitted to killing legally unprotected rodents and ferret 359 
badgers respectively in the three years preceding the study. More than 10% (10.2%) of 360 
respondents admitted to killing the protected masked palm civet (mean difference between 361 
RRT and DQ 9.82%). A greater proportion of respondents admitted to asking a hunter to kill 362 
leopard cat (9.7%) compared to admitting to killing this species themselves (6.0%) (mean 363 
difference between RRT and DQ 9.32% and 5.91% respectively).  Elder members of 364 
households were selected as respondents because locally they are reported to have more 365 
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experiences with the study species. However, this may have introduced bias to our results. 366 
Estimates of reported levels of killing should therefore be considered conservative. 367 
 368 
 369 
Figure 2 The proportion of respondents admitting to killing each of the species, or asking a 370 
hunter to kill leopard cats on their behalf in the three years preceding the study estimated 371 
using the randomised response technique (grey bars) and direct questions (white bars). Bold 372 
lines represent the median, the lower and upper edges of the boxes represent the first and 373 
third quartiles, and whiskers denote the maximum and minimum values. . Asterisks indicate 374 
species protected under the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1989. †denotes RRT estimates are 375 
significantly different compared to DQ. 376 
 377 
 378 
3.3  Deterrence  379 
The perceived probability of detection by the authorities for killing wildlife was not modelled 380 
as most of our respondents perceived no chance of capture for any of the species. The 381 
likelihood of admitting to killing wildlife was negatively related to the perceived probability 382 
of being punished if caught (t = -1.324, d.f. = 722, p = 0.186), however, this result was not 383 
significant.  384 
 385 
The likelihood of admitting to killing any of the four species was negatively and significantly 386 
related to both injunctive (t = -2.294, d.f. = 722, p = 0.022) and descriptive norms (t = -5.709, 387 
d.f. = 722, p = <0.001).  Scenarios simulated from each of our fitted GLMMs predict that 388 
respondents reporting the injunctive norm that their family or friends would disapprove of 389 
them killing leopard cat were 9% less likely to have killed this species compared to those 390 
reporting that their friends and family would approve of such behaviour (Figure 3a). 391 
Respondents reporting the descriptive norm that they knew someone who had killed leopard 392 
cat in the last three years were 18.3% more likely to have admitted to killing this species 393 
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when asked via RRT, compared to someone reporting that they did not know anybody that 394 
had killed leopard cat (Figure 3b).  395 
 396 
Self-imposed deterrence, measured as the level of guilt respondents associated with the 397 
killing of each species, was not related to behaviour reported via RRT (t = 0.078, d.f. = 722, p 398 
= 0.938).  399 
 400 
 401 
Figure 3 Simulations from fitted generalised linear mixed models illustrating the relationships 402 
between human persecution of wildlife and (a) injunctive norms – perceived social approval 403 
and (b) descriptive norms – perceived typical behaviour of others. In Scenario 1 (white bars) 404 
the norm is set to its minimum value indicative of a weaker norm. In scenario 2 (grey bars) 405 
the norm is set to its maximum value indicative of a stronger social norm. Bold lines 406 
represent the median, the lower and upper edges of the boxes represent the first and third 407 
quartiles, and whiskers denote the maximum and minimum values.  408 
 409 
 410 
4. Discussion 411 
Investigating illegal resource use presents methodological challenges (Gavin et al. 2010) with 412 
data subject to unquantifiable biases, consequently much of our understanding of the 413 
determinants of compliance stem from modelling studies (Keane et al. 2008). For example 414 
bio-economic and agent-based models underpinned by rational actor assumptions have been 415 
used to explore the influence of sanctions on poacher behaviour (Keane et al. 2012; Milner-416 
Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992). However, rule-breakers do not simply compare 417 
marginal benefits with marginal costs, but respond to sociological norms internalised 418 
throughout their lifetime (Garoupa 1997). Recent developments in the application and 419 
analysis of specialised questioning techniques (techniques that add stochastic noise to 420 
respondents’ answers preventing individually incriminating information from being revealed 421 
whilst allowing population-level estimates to be calculated) including RRT (St. John et al. 422 
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2012) and the unmatched count technique (Nuno et al. 2013), facilitate linking reports of 423 
rule-breaking behaviour to a range of characteristics, including potential sources of 424 
compliance, thus contributing to a greater understanding of factors driving behaviour.  425 
 426 
Validation studies where the actual status of individuals is known (e.g. police or medical 427 
records) provide evidence that RRT stimulates more honest answers to sensitive questions 428 
compared to conventional survey techniques (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005). This suggests 429 
that whilst anonymity may increase response rates and reduce social-desirability bias (Ong 430 
and Weiss 2000), other mechanisms that offer respondents added protection further increase 431 
the validity of sensitive data. Studies comparing survey methods (including one study in 432 
Taiwan (Chi et al. 1972)) have reported that RRT returned higher estimates than DQ when 433 
the questions were sensitive; these higher estimates have been interpreted as evidence of 434 
more honest reporting (Chi et al. 1972; Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005; Solomon et al. 2007). 435 
There is growing evidence that RRT produces more accurate reports of involvement in illegal 436 
natural resource extraction compared to conventional direct questions: Twelve per cent of the 437 
population surveyed near Andasibe-Mantadia protected area, Madagascar reported eating 438 
sifaka (Propithecus diadema) when asked using RRT, compared to 3% using DQ 439 
(Razafimanahaka et al. 2012); RRT estimates of the proportion of people illegally extracting 440 
six types of natural resources from Kibale National Park, Uganda exceeded DQ estimates 441 
across all resource types  (Solomon et al. 2007); and compared to DQ, RRT estimated that a 442 
significantly higher proportion of fishers fished without permits in North Wales, UK (St. 443 
John et al. 2010a). However, even when using questioning techniques designed specifically 444 
for asking sensitive questions it is impossible to rule out untruthful reporting (Landsheer et al. 445 
1999). To maximise compliance with RRT instructions we used a symmetrical RRT design 446 
(meaning that prescribed responses were set as both yes (dice sum two, three or four), and no 447 
(dice sum 11 or 12), rather than as either yes or no) which has been shown to increase the 448 
extent to which people follow RRT instructions (Ostapczuk and Musch 2011). Further, the 449 
analogy of ‘playing a game’ was used when describing RRT to respondents (Chi et al. 1972). 450 
One principle disadvantage of RRT is that, because noise is added to the data by forced 451 
responses, the method demands a large sample size in order to achieve estimates with an 452 
acceptable margin of error; further, the random noise complicates analyses of associations 453 
(e.g. between behaviour and norms) (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005; Moshagen et al. 2013).   454 
 455 
Our estimates that within the last three years nearly 10% of residents asked someone to hunt 456 
leopard cat, whilst 6% admitted to killing them in person require serious consideration, 457 
particularly given the recent confirmed extinction of the clouded leopard (Neofelis nebulosa) 458 
in Taiwan, a loss partially attributed to human encroachment and hunting (Chiang 2007; 459 
Taipei Times 2013). Whilst there may be some overlap in the two estimates (i.e. some people 460 
admitting to killing the species themselves may be the hunters reported by other respondents) 461 
the number of killings every year may be detrimental to the population which numbers no 462 
more than several hundred individuals (Pei 2008).  Leopard cats are nocturnal lowland forest 463 
edge species with home ranges of ca. 5-6 km
2 
 as such it is inevitable that their home ranges 464 
will overlap with rural residences and agriculture lands (Pei 2008). Conflicts between humans 465 
and carnivores often stem from threats to human lives or livelihoods (Treves and Karanth 466 
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2003). This small carnivore (weighing 3-5kg; Francis 2008) poses neither threat within 467 
human-managed landscapes in Taiwan, with faecal analysis confirming that livestock do not 468 
constitute a major part of leopard cat diet. Nearly 60% of their diet constituted mammalian 469 
species (mainly rodents), the remainder being passerine birds, reptiles and invertebrates. 470 
Evidence of gallinaceous birds was found in just two out of 74 faecal samples (Chuang 471 
2012). Contrary to anecdotal evidence, poultry farmers (those owning thousands of poultry) 472 
did not report thinking that the leopard cat was a pest. The ten respondents perceiving leopard 473 
cat to be a pest owned less poultry (quantities below the mean), so any loss to predators 474 
represent a greater proportion of their property. Ten per cent of respondents also admitted to 475 
killing masked palm civets, the other protected species included in this study. Just three 476 
respondents reported perceiving this small omnivorous mammals, which feed mainly on 477 
fruits, other plant parts and occasionally invertebrates (Hwang 2008; Wang and Fuller 2003), 478 
as a pest. Further, masked palm civets have never been reported to injure or kill livestock 479 
such as chickens in Taiwan.  480 
 481 
A number of studies have used rational choice models to explore how economic incentives of 482 
illegal resource extraction should influence people’s behaviour (Keane et al. 2012; Milner-483 
Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992; Sumaila et al. 2006), but none have investigated 484 
relationships between peoples’ perceived threat of sanctions and their actual non-compliant 485 
behaviour. Deterrence is created by the threats of detection and punishment being 486 
communicated to individuals who then mediate these threats before they influence behaviour; 487 
perceived deterrence may therefore be a more informative way of understanding how 488 
enforcement influences behaviour (Grasmick and Green 1980). Across all species few 489 
respondents in our study perceived any threat of capture, precluding this variable from 490 
modelling. However, evidence that violators adjust their rule-breaking behaviour in response 491 
to patrol frequency (Milner-Gulland and Clayton 2002) suggests that this factor warrants 492 
further attention. Incorporating the perceived probability of receiving a penalty into our 493 
GLMM allowed us to investigate how the probability of being punished relates to rule-494 
breaking behaviour. Results suggest that respondents perceiving lower chances of being 495 
punished once caught, were marginally more likely to have admitted (via RRT) to killing 496 
wildlife in the three years preceding the study. Research on perceived deterrence indicates 497 
that the influence of penalties on behaviour strengthens as the perceived probability of 498 
capture increases. For example across eight illegal acts Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) reported 499 
a strengthening relationship between behaviour and severity of penalties as the perceived 500 
certainty of capture increased. The zero chance of capture perceived by most of our 501 
respondents prevented us from exploring any interaction effects between perceived 502 
probabilities of detection and punishment. 503 
 504 
Social norms established by informal institutions have long contributed towards the 505 
management of natural resources (Berkes et al. 2000) and continue to exert influence. For 506 
example social norms influenced re-enrolment to China’s grain-to-green payment for 507 
ecosystem services scheme (Chen et al. 2009) and decisions by foresters to conserve habitat 508 
(Primmer and Karppinen 2010). In this study we measured two types of social norm in order 509 
to explore their potential deterrent effects. Results from our fitted GLMMs indicate that 510 
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social approval (injunctive norms) is related to behaviour. Respondents reporting that their 511 
family and friends would disapprove of them killing wildlife were less likely to have 512 
admitted (via RRT) to killing each species as compared to respondents reporting that their 513 
friends and family would approve of such behaviours. Our findings suggest that perceptions 514 
of how others behave (descriptive norms) have a stronger influence on behaviour compared 515 
to social approval. In our model there was a negative relationship between the descriptive 516 
norm reported for each species and RRT response; people reporting that they did not know 517 
others who had killed each animal, were less likely to have admitted killing it. The stronger 518 
association between behaviour and descriptive, compared to injunctive norms may be an 519 
artifice of the ‘false consensus’ effect (Ross et al. 1977) whereby people bias their reports of 520 
others’ behaviour in accordance with their own. This phenomenon has previously been 521 
suggested as a proxy indicator of involvement in illicit acts (Petróczi et al. 2008; St. John et 522 
al. 2012). However, relationships in our data between behaviour and both injunctive and 523 
descriptive norms, whereby behaviours typically disapproved of and not thought to be 524 
conducted by others are deterred, support the findings of others. For example, messages of 525 
social disapproval reduced environmental theft and littering (Cialdini 2003); and estimates of 526 
the number of friends’ performing illegal behaviours was positively related to respondents’ 527 
rule-breaking behaviour (Cross et al. 2013; Grasmick and Green 1980; Petróczi et al. 2008).  528 
 529 
The anticipation of guilt has been shown to influence decisions to perform pro-environmental 530 
behaviours (Ahn et al. 2013) and break the law (Grasmick and Bursik 1990). In Taiwan three 531 
types of guilt have been described: Nei jiu associated with failure to fulfil obligations to 532 
others; Zui e gan associated with moral transgressions and; Fan zui gan linked to breaking 533 
rules or laws that apply to everyone (Bedford 2004). Whilst fan zui gan may be experienced 534 
when breaking rules (actual or perceived), if a rule is not accepted or known, guilt may not be 535 
associated with transgression (Bamberg and Möser 2007; Bedford 2004). The limited 536 
knowledge of wildlife laws observed in our sample may explain why we did not find any 537 
association between guilt and respondents’ wildlife-killing behaviour (reported using RRT). 538 
However, clear relationships between explanatory factors and behaviour may fail to become 539 
apparent due to mismatches between information gathered and the behaviour of interest (St. 540 
John et al. 2010b), or because questions posed fail to capture the construct of interest 541 
(Robinson et al. 1991). Our statements aiming to measure guilt may have lost some of their 542 
meaning through delivery or translation although we believe our survey-delivery training and 543 
translation-back-translation procedure minimized such errors. Whilst there is considerable 544 
evidence that internalised values (e.g. attitude and social norms) influence behaviour 545 
(Armitage and Conner 2001), personal values do not always accord with the law. Therefore 546 
some people may engage in  illegal acts because they do not perceive them to be wrong 547 
(Tyler 2006). As such it is possible that guilt is not always associated with rule-breaking 548 
behaviour.  549 
 550 
Few respondents were aware that law protects leopard cat and masked palm civet and that 551 
they could be penalised if caught killing either species. This suggests that knowledge of 552 
wildlife laws is insufficient. However, whilst rules are only likely to be effective when they 553 
are known by the people whose behaviour they are designed to regulate, currently the extent 554 
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to which changes in awareness of rules translate into changes in compliance is unclear 555 
(Keane et al. 2011). There is evidence that environmental campaigns that solely provide 556 
information can be ineffective at bringing about behaviour change (Kollmuss and Agyeman 557 
2002). Consequently, providing residents of Miaoli County with information on the 558 
characteristics and legal status of Taiwan’s protected species alone may not reduce illegal 559 
hunting. However, social marketing campaigns, which apply commercial marketing concepts 560 
to promote behaviour change have had considerable success in reducing undesirable 561 
behaviours (e.g. tobacco use) and promoting desirable ones (e.g. using mosquito nets to 562 
prevent malaria) (Lee and Kotler 2011). A social marketing campaign promoting the existing 563 
social norm that killing protected species is generally disapproved of, may be an effective 564 
way of influencing the behaviour of the small minority who currently hunt illegally or seek 565 
the services of professional hunters. This information will be fed into the strategy of the 566 
Miaoli Leopard Cat Conservation Action Plan run by the Taiwan Forestry Bureau (Pei et al. 567 
2014) which is already undertaking protection activities including establishing the Miaoli 568 
Leopard Cat Important Habitat. However, as any behaviour-change intervention takes time, 569 
conservation law enforcement will remain important. This study has drawn upon rational 570 
choice theories of crime and research in social psychology exploring the influence of social 571 
norms and guilt on people’s behaviour. Other internal and external factors undoubtedly 572 
influence how people behaviour in complex social-ecological systems, however, a single 573 
study investigating all potential factors would most probably lose its practicality and meaning 574 
(Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). 575 
 576 
Conclusion 577 
Investigating sensitive topics, such as the persecution of protected species, requires the use of 578 
specialised questioning techniques that provide respondents with additional assurances of 579 
confidentiality. In this study we investigated relationships between past rule-breaking 580 
behaviour, reported via RRT, and current perceptions of three potential sources of deterrence: 581 
probabilities of detection and punishment, social norms and self-imposed guilt.  Our results 582 
provide evidence that social pressures influence rule-breaking behaviour even when the 583 
perceived threat of state-imposed sanctions is low. We found that two types of social norms 584 
deter wildlife persecution: perceptions of what others typically approve or disapprove of; and 585 
perceptions of how others typically behave. Whilst conventional enforcement is likely to 586 
remain an essential part of any compliance regime, harnessing social norms that encourage 587 
compliance offers potential for reducing the persecution of protected species whose survival 588 
is threatened.  Critically, at a time when conservation law enforcement is receiving increased 589 
attention and adopting new technologies (often associated with war zones), care must be 590 
taken not to breakdown existing norms that encourage compliance. 591 
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